

Risk Control Guide

# Security

## Introduction

To prevent intruders such as thieves, vandals and arsonists from gaining access to any premises, suitable security measures are essential. Some intruders will be opportunistic, but others are determined and organised intruders who will have done their homework in targeting the “weakest link in the chain”. This is why a “layered protection” approach is often the best approach to achieve a level of security commensurate with the risk.

This guide focuses on perimeter and building security. It makes reference to guidance and best practice published within the United Kingdom.

## Essential Principles for Security of Property

Security measures can be considered in terms of three broad categories:

- Physical security
- Electronic security
- Human security

Some key points to remember when assessing or considering security measures are:

- Use specialist installers who are certified and approved by the organisations such as National Security Inspectorate ([NSI](#)) or The Security Systems Alarms Inspection Board ([SSAIB](#)). They will install in accordance with the appropriate standard and with the manufacturer’s guidelines
- Integrate security measures so that they work together. This includes integration with fire, health and safety measures, as well as cyber security measures
- Ensure that security measures are commensurate with the risk
- Ensure that security measures are managed and maintained regularly
- Ensure that staff are trained in the use of security systems and know how to respond to activations or breakdowns

Best practice when reviewing existing or planning new security can be found in [Essential Principles for the Security of Property \(S20\)](#) published by RISC Authority. This covers security risk assessment, effective communication, reduction of intrinsic risk, strategy, active and passive protection measures, selection of providers, training, maintenance, continuous review and the retention of records.

## Security Fencing

Security fencing, particularly when used in conjunction with static guards and/or security lighting and CCTV is a very useful first line of defence.

There are two main types of fencing:

- Perimeter fencing, such as chain-link, welded mesh, and steel-palisade
- Electrified security fencing

Certified companies will be able to install fencing to the relevant British Standard listed at the end of this guidance.

Maintenance of security fencing is very important and procedures should be in place whereby the fence is inspected in its entirety on a regular basis, according to the degree of risk.

Any breaks, holes or other damage should be repaired without delay. Wherever possible, trees and undergrowth

should not be permitted to grow close to the fence (on either side) as these can provide concealment and possibly be an aid to scaling the fence. For the same reasons, pallets, material storage, outbuildings, skips, etc. should not be positioned close to a security fence.

Gates in security fencing should be installed with a commensurate level of security to the fence itself. In particular they should have no gaps or climbing aids that could be exploited by intruders.

The hinge pins of security gates should be capped by a disc of mild steel welded to the top of the pin to prevent the gates being lifted off their hinges, and good quality close shackle padlocks should be used to secure gates.

Alarm signalling on fences may be local (audible) to an on-site security facility, or remote to an Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) – see later for more on intruder alarms.

## Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)

The presence of a CCTV system is widely accepted as a useful means to deter, or otherwise help to detect and limit, unauthorised access and criminal activity.

There are many types of CCTV system available. Whatever type of system is used, it is important that it is reliable, resilient against interference and has the appropriate coverage. All 'at risk' areas should be covered e.g. entry points, approach routes and areas attractive to trespassers/criminals. A suitable method of 'real time' monitoring and response to viewed events is also essential.

NSI or SSAIB certified companies will be able to install CCTV to the relevant British Standard (listed at the end of this guidance) and in accordance with manufacturer guidance.

Detector-activated CCTV systems monitored at a remote video or alarm receiving centre, allow intrusion to be detected and observed remotely without the need for continuous on site monitoring. They should be integrated with intruder alarm systems and, when specific conditions are met, they can be eligible for a police response.

Prior to the installation of CCTV systems, careful analysis should be made in consultation with insurers.

## Doors

Doors, especially those of lighter construction, can be vulnerable to attack by intruders even when they are fitted with the best quality locks and bolts. Door panels can be kicked-in or hand-tools used to cut a body-sized hole.

Even doors that appear solid are frequently found upon close inspection to be of only semi-solid construction and/or filled with lightweight material. It is therefore essential to reinforce such doors with sheet steel; particularly for external doors or internal doors in vulnerable or target risk areas.

Timber doors should be of external grade and a minimum thickness of 45mm, noting that hardwood is generally stronger than softwood.

The following specification is suitable for locksmiths or builders when over-cladding and improving door security:

- Doors to be clad on their external face with a single panel of sheet steel not less than 1.5mm fixed using coach-bolts of a minimum diameter of 6mm passing through the full thickness of the door and spaced at intervals not exceeding 150mm, all round the perimeter of the door
- Coach-bolts to be fitted at similar intervals through the cross bracing and centre rails of the door
- All securing nuts and washers to be on the inside of the door welded to the bolts, or alternatively the ends of the bolts should be modified (burred) so they can't be readily undone
- If in exceptional circumstances, it is necessary to steel-reinforce the door on its internal face, 5.5mm diameter wood screws with non-return heads and at least 25mm in length should be used at intervals not exceeding 100mm in place of coach-bolts

- Hinge bolts should be installed top and bottom. In order to carry the additional weight it may be necessary to fit additional hinges to the door

An alternative is to install internal or external lockable steel bar/mesh gates, roller shutters, or internal collapsible (folding) steel grilles. These should be professionally fitted and ideally be certified as meeting a recognised security standard (see the list at the end of this guidance).

## Windows

Many intruders will favour access via a window to gain unlawful entry.

Window locks offer a minimum level of protection that may be sufficient to deter an inexperienced opportunist, but they will not withstand a determined attempt at forced entry. Levering a window frame with a hand-tool, or simply breaking and removing a glass pane will generally be sufficient to gain access.

It can therefore be desirable in many instances, to ensure that glass is laminated, and to fit steel bar grilles to windows, particularly those in vulnerable locations.

The following specification is suitable for locksmiths or builders when installing window grille bars:

- Grilles to comprise vertical solid steel bars at least 20mm in diameter or square section spaced at not more than 100mm centres. The bars to pass through and be welded to tie bars of flat steel not less than 35mm x 6mm spaced not more than 600mm apart
- Grilles to be fixed, preferably on the inside of a window opening, using one of the following methods:
  - Bars to be grouted into the brickwork at top and bottom to a depth of at least 50mm and set back at least 50mm from the surface of the wall
  - Tie bars to be cut, splayed and grouted into brickwork to a depth of at least 50mm and set back at least 50mm from the surface of the wall
  - The bars to be welded to a frame of angle iron with a minimum dimension of 35mm x 35mm x 3mm which is fixed to the brickwork surrounding the window (not to the window frame) by either 75mm x 9mm proprietary anchor bolt for fixing into masonry (e.g. Rawlbolts) or 75mm 5.5mm diameter countersunk woodscrews with suitable proprietary wall plugs at 300mm intervals all round the opening. Bolts or screws to be spot welded to the frame

Alternatively, consider internal or external lockable steel bar/mesh gates, roller shutters, or internal collapsible (folding) steel grilles. These should be professionally fitted and ideally be certified as meeting a recognised security standard (see the list at the end of this guidance).

## Physical Security - Locks

There are a wide range of security locks available to purchase. These include five-lever mortice deadlocks, 5 pin (+) cylinder locks, multilocks and magnetic locks. The complexity and quality of lock design and manufacture is fundamental to the level of protection provided. A summary of related British / European standards is included at the end of this guidance.

Claims that a lock has been tested to a particular standard can only be relied upon where the test has been undertaken and “certified” by a recognised independent test body.

For the UK these include:

- British Standards Institute (Kitemark scheme) <https://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/kitemark/>
- Master Locksmiths Association (Sold Secure scheme) [www.soldsecure.com](http://www.soldsecure.com)
- Building Research Establishment Limited (LPCB scheme) <https://www.bregroup.com/products/lpcb/>

## Intruder Alarms

Intruder alarms are often a prerequisite of insurance. They provide a high level of theft deterrence as well as early notification of unauthorised entry.

RSA recommends in the UK that intruder alarm systems be installed and maintained by a company that is recognised as an installer of intruder alarms by either the NSI or the SSAIB. It will need to be recognised as a Compliant Company by the relevant responding police force. This means they can install and maintain in accordance with the appropriate standards.

Unless more specifically confirmed, the security grading of the intruder alarm system (detection and control equipment) should be to Grade 3 as detailed in BS EN 50131 and PD 6662.

It is also likely that remote signalling to an ARC will be a condition of insurance cover. The ARC should be one that is inspected and certified by the NSI or SSAIB. In some circumstances, a more restricted selection of installation, maintenance and / or monitoring companies may be warranted.

In order to also be eligible for a police response, a police Unique Reference Number (URN) will be required. In order to obtain this, the alarm system needs to transmit “confirmable” alerts to the ARC. To obtain a URN, and be eligible for a Level 1 police response, the following will need to be in place:

- Compliance with BS 8243, which also details the acceptable means of setting/unsetting alarms
- Compliance with the local police force’s System Security Policy or Police Scotland policy
- Having two sequential alarm detections within a given timeframe (CCTV and microphones may also be used, but only in support of a sequential alarm detection) – thus enabling the first alarm detection to be confirmed by the ARC. The whole system designed and configured, such that when an intruder enters any part of the protected premises, there is a high degree of certainty that the alarm system will deliver a confirmed alarm message
- Signalling by any Dual Path (DP) remote signalling product that has been tested and certified to be at Grade 4 as defined in the latest editions of BS 50136-1 and PD 6669, or LPS1277 issue 3 (as conforming to ATS5 configured as such and installed in accordance with Annex C of that standard)
- Following the cancellation of an alarm signal the system must re-arm without any zone, sensor or detector being locked out, so that the whole system remains alert to signal further alarm information during the set period
- To prevent tampering once the system has been set, any microphones and cameras intended for confirmation purposes must be located within areas covered by intruder alarm detection devices
- All control and remote signalling equipment other than ancillary control equipment (such as remote keypads and digital key readers) must be located so that it cannot be accessed whilst the alarm is set, without creating a confirmed alarm condition
- Confirmation of the actions to be taken by the ARC and site staff upon receipt of the following alarm messages or information:
  - A confirmed alarm condition, including circumstances where the loss of one or more signalling paths contribute to the confirmation criteria
  - An unconfirmed alarm condition, including any variations according to whether or not the system can be rearmed in its entirety
  - A telecommunications failure, including the failure of one telecommunication path in a dual-path signalling system

If the alarm is activated (whether the activation is confirmed or not), or any signalling path is lost, the appointed keyholder will need to attend the premises (preferably not alone) immediately to investigate the reason for the activation.

Response to an alert, fault or call from the ARC must be by site staff who can attend within 20 minutes (preferably not alone) or a professional (Security Industry Association ([SIA](#)) approved) keyholding company, even if the police have responded.

If there is a fault with the alarm system or an alarm signalling path, an alarm technician should be called and the keyholder should not leave the premises unattended until they are fully re-secured, with the alarm system and its signalling paths fully reset.

Inform Insurance representatives immediately if there is a notification of a reduced level or withdrawal of Police response to the intruder alarm system.

Never leave the premises unattended, unless physically secured and the alarm system is fully set including the designated methods of remote signalling.

The UK's telephone network is soon to be upgraded in such a way that alarm systems will need to communicate to the ARC using Internet Protocol (IP) technology. Alarm installers and ARCs will be able to advise on any changes this may require to existing alarm systems.

The following provides further good practice guidance suitable for most commercial and industrial premises:

- Except for ancillary control equipment (such as remote keypads and digital key readers), control and signalling equipment should be located in a position where it is concealed from general view and is least vulnerable to attack
- Audible warning should be by either two external self-actuating audible warning devices or by one external self-actuating warning device and an internal self-actuating siren or two tone electronic sounder, each giving a sound emission of at least 100dB at 1 metre
- Where it is not possible to install an external warning device above 3 metres (i.e. so that it would not be readily reached from ground level), fit two external self-actuating warning devices. They should be sited on different elevations of the premises, where possible
- Where the system has remote signalling, which is usually desirable, site any internal warning device remotely from the control panel so as not to identify the position of the panel when activated. For the same reason, any internal sounders used as part of the alarm setting / unsetting procedure should also be sited remotely from the control panel
- The means of unsetting should be via an entry door lock linked to the alarm, unless the entry route or premises are considered low risk, in which case, use of a remote control device (transmitter or fob) upon entry may be acceptable
- Many alarm companies will wish to maintain intruder alarms remotely, without visiting the premises. In some cases, this functionality may invalidate insurance cover

Failure to both fully secure and alarm the premises may invalidate insurance cover.

## Guarding

Traditional security guarding remains a mainstay in security strategy. To help ensure that security guards provide a good quality defence they should be subject to suitable background checks and certifications, and suitable onsite systems such as guard tour verification and lone worker controls.

In the UK licensed security personnel can be contracted from firms that are approved by the NSI, SSAIB or the SIA Approved Contractor Scheme.

Guarding solutions should be carefully managed and should integrate with all other security measures.

## Protection of Unoccupied Buildings

Fire, theft and malicious damage in empty premises is a significant cause of loss.

There is evidence to suggest that once a building has been vandalised, further attacks can occur within a short period of time.

Good management procedures including regular inspection visits (at least once a week) and regular maintenance of the property and its fire and security systems can help to prevent criminal attacks and also reduce the eventual cost of remedial work should a loss occur.

It is important to ensure that the fabric of the building is maintained and kept in good order. Without regular maintenance an unoccupied property can quickly become run-down and attract unwelcome attention, such as from vandals and fly-tippers. Graffiti should be removed and any damage repaired without delay.

Unoccupied buildings are an attractive playground to children. Children and other trespassers are owed a duty of care such that even unoccupied buildings need to be maintained as safe environments as far as reasonably practicable. Unoccupied buildings should of course be maintained as safe environments for those with legitimate access.

Best practice precautions should include the removal of all non-essential contents and services. However adequate physical security and alarms should be maintained. Further mitigation can include the use of guarding, boarding of windows/doors and the use of temporary alarms.

## Security Fogging Devices

A Security Fogging Device is an electronically operated security system, which on activation produces a dense “fog” in order to disorientate a potential thief and deter/hinder further access into the protected area.

Fog is produced by passing glycol (or other fluid) through a heating block, where it vaporises before being emitted into the area to be protected. As the vapour is released into the atmosphere it instantly condenses to form a dense white fog. Glycol based products are considered to be non-toxic.

Security fog may be combined with flashing lights and sirens to further disorientate potential thieves. These systems are typically used in retail environments and careful consideration should be given to employee and customer safety.

Security Fog Devices should be designed, installed and maintained in accordance with the manufacturers specifications and conform to BS EN 50131-8 in conjunction with insurers requirements.

## Cash Security and Defence against Robbery

Cash continues to be one of the most thief-attractive commodities. Businesses most at risk include those dealing with high value easily transportable goods such as jewellery, designer clothing, portable electronic devices, tobacco products, wines and spirits. Cash related operations such as post offices, pawnbrokers, book makers and petrol filling stations are also at high risk of being targeted. Cash dispensing machines also increase the likelihood of an attack as do late night working hours.

Where possible, the amount of cash held at any given time should be minimised. Cash holdings can be further reduced by making/receiving payments by cheque or electronic transfer.

Staff involved with cash exposures, even those not directly handling cash can find themselves involved in a threatening situation simply through their presence at the scene of a criminal attack.

As well as having a good layered defence at the premises, there are a number of further measures that can be deployed to mitigate the risk, which include:

- Sound management and procedures when handling cash
- Reinforcement of cash rooms, doors and glazing
- Securing cash and valuables in safes
- Use of professional cash carriers
- Security fogging devices

The standards and resources listed at the end of this guidance provide more detailed information.

## Computer and Electronic Equipment Security

Computer and other electronic office equipment in business premises are particularly attractive to thieves. The impact of theft is not just related to loss of hardware but may also compromise data security and cause significant business interruption.

In environments where thieves may operate, which includes open plan office environments, portable computer equipment should be locked safely away or secured to the workstation when not attended. Care should be taken that securing equipment is compatible with the computer equipment and associated warranties.

In environments where higher value items are used/stored (server rooms for example), there are a number of devices and solutions such as secure areas, cages, anchoring equipment etc. that can be deployed to minimise the risk of theft. Additionally, there are many procedural measures that can be employed to reduce risks.

See the standards and resources at the end of this guidance for more details.

## Fuel Crime

Above ground diesel tanks at farms, goods storage locations and domestic premises are a target for fuel thieves.

Collateral damage following fuel theft can often lead to fuel leaks contaminating the ground with associated high clean-up costs.

Given this theft risk, all fuel storage facilities should be subject to a suitable risk assessment.

Fuel tank theft security measures include:

- Isolation of electric pumps
- Closed shackle padlocks on filler caps
- Anti-siphon devices
- Minimising fuel levels
- Appropriate access controls, fencing, lighting, CCTV and alarms where practical

## Metal Theft

The rising worldwide demand for metals has resulted in a significant increase in their market value which in turn has led to a very serious rise in the number of metal related thefts, particularly of non-ferrous metals such as copper and lead.

Many of the losses have involved thieves targeting unoccupied buildings for copper cabling, pipe-work, sanitary fittings and lead from roofs.

In addition to the cost of replacing stolen property, the damage caused to the fabric of the building through its forced removal can also incur very large repair bills. Where the theft of lead from roofs has not been detected quickly enough, losses have been greatly increased due to subsequent damage caused following rainwater ingress.

It is important to identify all of the potential at risk areas – stock, building fittings, lead roof tiles, plumbing/pipes, cabling/cable trays, boilers, plant room equipment, fences/gates/posts etc. as some may not be obvious.

Solutions include those already detailed within this guide (secure areas, alarms, CCTV etc.). The use of security tagging/marking schemes can also be a benefit.

## Standards and Further Resources

The following list details resources, guidance and formal standards in use in the UK. References to some European sources and standards are however also included.



## Key resources

**RISCAuthority** (the UK property insurers' technical advice body) is an authoritative source for information on all of the subjects and measures in this guidance. RISCAuthority is a free resource and is available at <https://www.riscauthority.co.uk/free-document-library/>. Once on the landing page, click on *Security and Arson Prevention* for a list of guidance documents, or search in the search box.

There are a large number of British and European Standards with the prefix of (BS, EN, PAS and PD) relating to the security topics covered in this guidance document that can all be found at **British Standards Institution** [www.bsi-global.com](http://www.bsi-global.com). Many of the relevant ones are listed below in the next section.

The **Loss Prevention Certification Board (LPCB)** scheme (run by the Building Research Establishment (BRE)) has many Loss Prevention Standards (LPS) that provide guidance on various security measures, as well as security products that have been tested to meet strict security criteria and grades. These can be found at [www.redbooklive.com](http://www.redbooklive.com).

**Secured By Design (SBD)** is an official police security initiative that aims to "improve the security of buildings and their immediate surroundings to provide safe places to live, work, shop and visit". There is a lot of good security advice and guidance here at [www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com).

## Standards and further guidance

### General security guidance (further to those above):

- The British Insurance Brokers Association (BIBA) – [www.biba.org.uk/](http://www.biba.org.uk/)
- Association of British Insurers - [www.abi.org.uk](http://www.abi.org.uk)
- Confederation of Fire Protection Associations (Europe). While much of the resources listed will be relevant outside of the UK (many of the standards apply in both the UK and EU), the following website is a useful source for some generic security measures across Europe:  
<http://cfpa-e.eu/cfpa-e-guidelines/guidelines-security-form/>

### Regulatory and trade bodies

- Security Industry Authority (SIA) - [www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk)
- The National Security Inspectorate (NSI) – [www.nsi.org.uk](http://www.nsi.org.uk)
- British Security Industry Association (BSIA). [www.bsia.co.uk/](http://www.bsia.co.uk/)
- The Security Systems and Alarms Inspection Board (SSAIB) – [www.ssaib.org](http://www.ssaib.org)
- The Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) [ico.org.uk](http://ico.org.uk)
- Building Research Establishment (BRE) – runs the LPCB detailed above - [www.bre.co.uk](http://www.bre.co.uk)

### Security fences/Ram raid

- BS1722:10:2019 Specification for chain-link and welded mesh anti-intruder fences. This type of fence can be considered suitable as a general purpose or low security fence. Where enhanced levels of security are required BS1722 part 12 or 14 should be specified
- BS1722:12:2019 Specification for Steel Palisade anti-intruder fences. This type of fence can be considered suitable for all types of fencing from general purpose to extra high security fencing
- BS1722:14:2019 Specification for open mesh steel panel fences. This standard specifies the requirements for four standards of open mesh steel panel fence ranging from fences suitable for boundary and general purpose to fences suitable for extra high security
- BS1722:17:2019 Specification for electric security fencing - design, installation and maintenance. This standard specifies the requirements for electric security fencing
- PAS 68 and PAS 69 relate to ram raid defences and vehicle barriers
- Fence Contractors Association - [www.fencingcontractors.org](http://www.fencingcontractors.org)

### CCTV

- BS EN 62676-1-1:2014 - Video surveillance systems for use in security applications. System requirements. General
- BS 8418:2015+A1:2017 - Installation and remote monitoring of detector-activated CCTV systems
- The BSIA guide for CCTV installation <https://www.bsia.co.uk/bsia-front/pdfs/172-basic-guide-bs8418-2015-cctv-installers.pdf>
- [NPCC Police Requirements & Response to Security Systems Policy or Police Scotland policy](#)
- The Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) – Code of Conduct for CCTV

<https://ico.org.uk/>

#### Buildings, doors, hatches, shutters and glazing

- BS 8220-2:1995 - Guide for security of buildings against crime. Offices and shops
- BS 8220-3:2004 - Guide for security of buildings against crime. Storage, industrial and distribution premises
- LPS 1175:2010 Requirements and testing procedures for the LPCB approval and listing of intruder resistant building components, strongpoints, security enclosures and free-standing barriers
- BS EN 1627:2011 Pedestrian doorsets, windows, curtain walling, grilles and shutters - Burglar resistance - Requirements and classification
- BS 5357:2007 - Code of practice for installation and application of security glazing (high resistance to attack)
- PAS 24:2016 – criteria for testing windows and door sets against casual burglars. This PAS applies to manual attack testing of single leaf domestic doorsets and windows, including locks (but excluding picking/sawing) and hinges
- BS EN 356:2000 – code of practice for security glazing and resistance to manual attacks
- BS EN 1063:2000 - the standard for bullet resistant glass
- BS EN 1522:1999 and BS EN 1523 - standard required for frames for bullet resistant windows, shutters and blinds
- LPS 1270: Issue 1.1. Requirements and testing procedures for the LPCB approval and listing of intruder resistant security glazing units
- Door and Hardware Federation (DHF) - <http://www.dhfonline.org.uk/>
- Glass & Glazing Federation – [www.ggf.org.uk](http://www.ggf.org.uk)

#### Locks

- BS EN 12209:2016 – specifications for door locks, relating to other standards below. This is a UK version of a European Standard for door locks. Numerous different combinations (Grades) of lock case/lock mechanism and key security are available, plus related testing for attack resistance, force, durability, fire and safety
- BS x621 series. The one most common standard is BS 3621, evolving into the x621 Series, which sits alongside European Standards for door locks (EN 12209 (above) and EN 1303 (below))
- BS 3621 2011-2017 – 5 lever mortice deadlocks, cylinder deadlocks and rim locks that can be opened from either side by a key
- BS 8621 – as BS 3621 but with no key required to exit (e.g. thumb lock)
- PAS 3621 - For multi-point locks with keys required both sides
- PAS 8621 - For multi-point locks with keyless egress
- BS 1303:2012 Cylinder lock specifications (will still require to meet TS007/SS312 below). This is a UK version of a European Standard for lock cylinders. Various security levels against attack and for key security are available
- TS007 (3 star level) and SS312 – cylinder lock resistance to snapping attacks. This is a UK Standard developed to recognise and protect against the risk of 'snapping attacks' on door lock cylinders. Snapping attacks relate to a form of criminal attack whereby a protruding cylinder is gripped by a wrench, or similar tool, and twisted until it snaps in its narrow middle section. TS 007 cylinders with a 3 Star rating can resist such attacks on their own, but a 1 Star cylinder needs to be married up with a 2 Star surrounding door handle to give an overall 3 Star level of protection
- BSEN 12320:2012. This standard reflects a European Standard for padlocks and staples (padbars) of all types, i.e. open and closed shackle. Security Grades range from 1-6, 6 being the highest.
- BS EN 179:2008 & BS EN 1125:2008 - for emergency escape door mechanisms. These standards are UK versions of European Standards for emergency escape door mechanisms at premises where, respectively, no panic is likely to occur, e.g. a factory/office, and those where it might, e.g. a shop or club/pub. Where an external keylock is incorporated, it should be tested to a security level chosen from BS EN 12209 (for external attack only)
- Master Locksmiths Association (Sold Secure scheme) [www.soldsecure.com](http://www.soldsecure.com)

#### Intruder alarms

- PD 6662 and BS EN 50131 – relates to the various types and installation of intruder and hold up alarms
- LPS 1277, PD 6669 and BS 50136-1 refer to alarm transmission systems
- BS 8243 – relates to 'confirmable' alarm requirements
- BS 9263:2016 refers to remote technical access into alarm systems
- BS EN 50518:2019 – best practice for ARCs
- SSAIB Code of practice for temporary alarms
- NPCC Systems Security Policy <https://www.policesecuritysystems.com/>

#### Keyholding services, guarding, couriers

- BS 7984-1:2016 Keyholding and response services. General recommendations for keyholding and response services
- BS 7499:2020 – Static Site Guarding and Mobile Patrol Services, Code of Practice

#### Security fogging

- BS EN 50131-8:2009. Alarm Systems Intrusion and hold up systems – part 8

#### Safes, strong rooms and ATMs

- BS EN 1143-1:2019 - Secure storage units. Requirements, classification and methods of test for resistance to burglary. Part 1 - Safes, ATM safes, strongrooms. Part 2 where deposit systems are incorporated
- The LPCB scheme (LPS 1175) also provides details of approved safes and strong rooms all of which comply with this standard above
- LPS 1183 Part 1: Issue 4.3 Requirements and testing procedures for the LPCB approval and listing of safe storage units Part one: Safes and strongrooms
- BS 7582:2005 British Standard Code of Practice for Reconditioning of Used Safes
- BS 7872:2011 - Code of Practice for Operation of Cash In Transit Services
- [European Certification Board - Security \(ECB-S\)](#) scheme

#### Computer physical security

- Loss Prevention Standard (LPS) 1214 (#2) - anchoring and enclosures

#### Others

- Your local Crime Prevention Officer
- Cyber security for business - <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/> - click on “Information for...”

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